The unconditional expectation of social welfare is often used to assess alternative macroeconomic policy rules in applied quantitative research. It is shown that it is generally possible to derive a linearquadratic problem that approximates the exact non-linear problem where the unconditional expectation of the objective is maximised and the steady-state is distorted. Thus, the measure of policy performance is a linear combination of second moments of economic variables which is relatively easy to compute numerically, and can be used to rank alternative policy rules. The approach is applied to a simple Calvo-type model under various monetary policy rules. JEL Classification: E20; E32; F32; F41.
Introduction
suggests that, in quantitative theoretical investigations under rational expectations, macroeconomic stabilization policies ought to optimize the unconditional expectation of the policymaker's objective function. That perspective on policy assessment has proven popular; some prominent examples include Whiteman (1986) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) , Woodford (1999) , Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) , Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) , Kollman (2002) , Kim and Henderson (2005) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) .
The ordering of policies has conventionally been done by comparing losses calculated as a linear combination of the volatilities of output and in ‡ation gaps. That criterion can be justi…ed as a second-order approximation of the unconditional welfare of a representative agent around a non-distorted steady state.
As is well known, the non-distorted steady state is the allocation which maximizes utility in an economy in the absence of constraints. To justify use of the nondistorted steady state as the approximation 'point', it is necessary to assume that lump-sum taxation is available.
However, in the more interesting case when the steady-state is distorted, it is not known whether the loss function can be expressed as a linear combination of quadratic terms. This paper devises a tractable LQ formulation to the unconditionally optimal (UO) policy problem when the steady-state is distorted.
An advantage from doing this includes, as Benigno and Woodford (2007) note, the possibility of ranking alternative policies 1 .
To design our algorithm we extend the methodology of Damjanovic, Damjanovic and Nolan (DDN) (2008) , which derives the …rst-order necessary conditions for the policy optimizing the unconditional expectation of welfare 2 .
Then, similar to Judd (1999) and Benigno and Woodford (2007) , the linearquadratic approximation is done around the optimal deterministic steady state; 1 See also Kim and Kim (2007) . 2 See also Blake (2001) and McCallum (2002, 2010) and Whiteman (1986). 2 in our case around the unconditionally optimal steady-state and in Benigno and Woodford's case, the timeless-perspective (TP) steady-state. 3 In contrast to the timeless perspective, unconditional optimisation incorporates the e¤ect of policy on the distribution of initial conditions. However, we show that accounting for these initial conditions does not preclude the possibility of LQ approximation.
The paper highlights important di¤erences between UO and TP policies when the steady-state is distorted. Jensen and McCallum (2010) compare UO policies (what they call "optimal continuation" policies) with the TP, when the steadystate is e¢cient. In that case, it is shown that the form of the welfare function to be optimized is the same across policies. Here we show that the corresponding LQ problems can be signi…cantly di¤erent when the steady-state is distorted. We …nd that UO and TP approaches imply di¤erent steady states, di¤erent arguments in the social welfare function and di¤erent dynamic constraints. Even the number of dynamic constraint may di¤er across the TP and UO policy problems.
Finally, we also develop a useful approach for constructing the unconditional welfare measure. Since this measure can be presented in the form of a linear combination of the second moments, one can apply the Anderson, McGrattan, Hansen and Sargent (1996) algorithm which has good convergence properties.
Consequently, it is also straightforward numerically to analyze UO policies.
A speci…c application of the approach is provided employing the canonical New Keynesian model. A number of insights emerge. First, unconditionally optimal monetary policy is characterized by trend in ‡ation. That trend in in ‡ation complicates the linear-quadrati…cation 4 . That explains a second insight: The second-order approximate loss function is no longer de…ned solely over terms in output and in ‡ation as found in DDN for the non-distorted steady-state case.
However, the loss function that one obtains is easily interpreted in light of the underlying distortions in the economy. The approximate loss function is used to evaluate and rank di¤erent simple rules for monetary policy (i.e., the nominal 3 See also Debortoli and Nunes (2006) and Levine, Pearlman and Pierse (2008) . 4 As shown in Ascari and Ropele (2008) and Damjanovic and Nolan (2010) .
3 interest rate). The welfare implications of nominal income targeting versus in ‡ation targeting are explored and our results are contrasted with some of those of Kim and Henderson (2005) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic problem is set out in a general form. The problem is analyzed and it is shown that one can derive a purely quadratic approximation to the unconditional expectation of the objective function. Section 3 begins the application; …rst a canonical New Keynesian, Calvo-price-setting model is set up. Section 4 formalizes the policy problem and demonstrates the application of the various steps in the approach of section 2. There is then a brief discussion of the implications for optimal monetary policy when the steady state is distorted and the authorities are optimizing over the unconditional loss function. In Section 5 we use the unconditional welfare criterion to explore brie ‡y the impact of di¤erent simple rules for monetary policy. Section 6 o¤ers some conclusions. Appendices contain proofs and details of key derivations.
The general problem
Consider a discounted loss function of the form
where   is the expectations operator conditional on information up through date ,  is the time discount factor, ( + ) is the period loss function and   is a vector of target variables. Speci…cally, 
Let us further assume, following Taylor (1979) , that the policy maker seeks to minimize the unconditional expectation of the loss function (2.1), subject to constraints, (2.2) 5 . That is, he or she searches for a policy rule
where  is the unconditional expectations operator. We call such a policy "unconditionally optimal" and denote it 'UO-policy'.
Solution
The …rst step is to formulate the non-linear policy problem and identify the nonstochastic steady state around which approximation needs to take place. Next, the possibility of a second-order approximation to welfare is addressed; speci…cally the possibility of a loss function that is solely a function of quadratic terms. However, an alternative approach to analyzing (2.2)-(2.4) is to solve a non-linear problem and to analyze the linearized optimality conditions. So, …nally in this section we establish the equivalence of the LQ approach (which is the central topic of this paper) with that alternative approach of "optimize then linearize". 5 Taylor's approach may be interpreted as a recommendation: Policymakers ought to seek to minimize the unconditional value of the loss function. This appears partly, perhaps largely, in response to the issue of time inconsistency. See Taylor (1979) for further discussion. McCallum (2005) is an interesting discussion of these, and related, issues.
Necessary conditions for an optimum
Consider the following Lagrangian function which derives from the above optimal policy problem: Judd (1999) , Woodford (2002) and Benigno and Woodford (2005) demonstrate very clearly that the choice of the steady-state is crucial (along with the solution concept for forward-looking policy problems) in being able to obtain LQ approximations to general non-linear, forward-looking policy problems. To choose the deterministic steady state around which log-linearization takes place, one needs to solve the system of …rst-order conditions (2.6), (2.7) and constraints (2.2) . The steady state ( ) is de…ned by the system (2.8-2.9) :
where ,  and  indicate the vectors of steady state values of endogenous variables, Lagrange multipliers and the average value of shocks, respectively. We refer to ( ) as the "unconditionally optimal steady state" 7 . 6 The notation  is a shorthand for the tensor product, P  =1      7 It is assumed throughout that system (2.8) has a unique solution.
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In the absence of shocks, solution (2.8) shows that unconditionally optimal policy delivers the steady state with the highest level of steady state welfare. This is not the case for "timeless perspective"-optimal policy. It is worth emphasizing that the TP approach discussed in Woodford (2002) implies di¤erent …rst-order conditions and therefore a di¤erent center of approximation. That di¤erence will be shown to lead to a di¤erent optimal monetary policy. 8 
The possibility of pure second-order approximation
The value of the loss function  (  ) should not change if combined with the unconditional expectation of the constraints  (        ). Thus, the appendix demonstrates that the second-order approximation to this combination has a pure second-order form. That is,
(2.10)
The notation 3 denotes third or higher-order terms.   and   are pure secondorder terms of the log-approximation, around the unconditionally optimal steady state, to the loss function  (  ) and dynamic constraints  ( +1       ) :
where we use b   to denote a log deviation from steady state.
It is straightforward to show that the maximization of the unconditional objective (2.10) subject to the linearized analogues of equations (2.2) yields the same solution as log-linearization of the …rst-order conditions (2.6) . This latter approach is proposed by Khan, King and Wolman (2004) 
7 of conditional optimization, and is extended in DDN (2008) to unconditional optimization. See Appendix 7.2 for a con…rmation of our assertion.
Substitution techniques for UO and TP policies
Although the method of pure second-order approximation, (2.10) , is straightforward and quite e¢cient, it may be useful to show how one can replicate the same welfare analysis by substituting variables employing the dynamic constraints, (2.2) . In particular, it demonstrates that even though UO policy cannot ignore initial conditions, that does not prevent one from using a substitution approach for UO policy analysis. Consider a second-order approximation to the dynamic constraint equations,
where   is a pure quadratic form. The TP methodology expresses the discounted sum of fb
That expression can be simpli…ed as
Then an initial value, b    is ignored as a "term independent of policy" and the …nal expression appears as
This expression is then used to calculate approximate utility.
To deriver the analogous expression in the case of UO policy one applies the unconditional expectations operator to (2.11) 
Then, one uses the fact that b  +1 = b   , which transforms (2.12) into 2.13) which is the desired expression.
Example: Calvo model with distorted steady state
A more or less canonical dynamic New Keynesian model is now developed and two issues in particular are pursued. First, which model variables appear in the approximate loss function? Second, some insight is sought into the nature of optimal monetary policy.
The Households
There is a large number of identical agents in this (closed) economy where the only input to production is labour. Each agent evaluates utility using the following criterion:
  denotes the conditional expectations operator at time ¸0,  is the discount factor,   is consumption and   () is the quantity of labour supplied to industry ; labour is industry speci…c. ¸0 measures the labour supply elasticity while  is a 'preference' parameter.
Consumption is de…ned over a Dixit-Stiglitz basket of goods
The average price-level,   , is known to be
The demand for each good is given by
where   () is the nominal price of the …nal good produced in industry  and    denotes aggregate demand.
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Agents face the ‡ow constraint
As all agents are identical, the only …nancial assets traded in equilibrium will be those issued by the …scal authority. Here   denotes the nominal value of government bond holdings, at the end of date  1 +   is the nominal interest rate on this 'riskless' one-period nominal asset,   is the nominal wage in period  (our assumptions mean that we do not need to index wages on ), and ¦  indicates any pro…ts remitted to the individual. It is assumed that labour income is taxed at rate  . The usual conditions are assumed to apply to the consumer's limiting net savings behavior. Hence, necessary conditions for an optimum include:
and
Here   denotes the real wage. The complete markets assumption implies the existence of a unique stochastic discount factor,
Representative …rm: factor demand
As noted, labour is the only factor of production. Firms are monopolistic competitors who produce their distinctive goods according to the following
where   () denotes the amount of labour hired by …rm  in period ,   is a stochastic productivity shock and 1  .
The demand for output determines the demand for labour. Hence one …nds that
There is an economy-wide labour market so that all …rms pay the same wage for the same labour. As a result, as asserted above, one may write   () =    8
All households provide the same share of labour to all …rms. The total amount of labour will then be
where ¢  is the measure of price dispersion:
Representative …rm: price setting
As in Calvo (1983), each period a …xed proportion of …rms are allowed to adjust prices. Those …rms choose the nominal price which maximizes their expected pro…t given that they have to charge the same price in  periods time with probability   . As usual, we assume that …rms are cost-takers. Let  0  () denote the choice of nominal price by a …rm that is permitted to re-price in period  As all …rms who are permitted to reprice will choose the same price, optimal repricing implies 3.14) where   is a cost-push shock. The price index then evolves according to the law of motion,
Because the relative prices of the …rms that do not change their prices in period  fall by the rate of in ‡ation, the law of motion for the measure of price dispersion is 
UO Monetary Policy
, so as to maximize social welfare function (4.1) subject to constraints (4.2)-(4.4):
subject to:
² Prices:   is the relative price set by …rms updating at time 
It is useful in formalizing this policy problem to de…ne some variables as follows:
indexes the steady state distortions in this economy.
One can set up the Hamiltonian for this problem, as proposed in section 2, as follows:
The necessary conditions for an optimum include:
To reduce a little on notation, denote 4.6) which represents marginal production costs.
The steady state
As noted, unconditionally optimal policy is associated with the highest level of steady-state welfare, unlike TP optimal policy. It is well known (see Benigno and Woodford, 2005) that TP optimal policy requires price stability in the steady state.
On the other hand, King and Wolman (1999) argue that a slightly positive in ‡ation rate maximises steady-state welfare. We now turn in more detail to steady-state analysis.
The value of the endogenous variables in steady state should solve the system of constraints (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) , (4.6) and the …rst-order conditions, (4.5) . As a result one obtains the following steady state equations:
(4.7)
Using these equations, one can derive the following expression
which can be used to infer certain properties of the optimal steady-state in ‡ation rate. Proof. See Appendix.
Using parameter values typically found in the literature, expression (4.8) implies that optimal steady state in ‡ation is of the order of 0.2% a year. As discussed in King and Wolman (1999) , this small positive trend in in ‡ation re ‡ects a number of con ‡icting e¤ects. On the one hand, a small amount of in ‡ation can boost demand, as it partially o¤sets the markup distortion. On the other hand, price dispersion, which is rising in in ‡ation, acts rather like a cost shock on …rms, for reasons analyzed in Damjanovic and Nolan (2010) . Hence, one …nds that optimal trend in ‡ation has a U-shaped relation to price stickiness, ; it is increasing in  when initial price dispersion is relatively small, and declines once initial price dispersion is su¢ciently large. Optimal in ‡ation declines in the discount factor, . As discussed in more detail in DDN (2008) and demonstrated in section 2.3, UO policy in contrast to timeless perspective policy, gives some weight to the distribution of initial conditions. In particular, it considers the distribution of the initial output gap. That is partly why some stimulation of output via in ‡ation is desirable. So the smaller the discount factor, the higher is the relative weight on initial conditions and the higher the optimal in ‡ation rate. Finally, we note that the nominal interest rate is positive in the UO steady state. That conclusion follows from the Euler equation (3.8) which yields 1(1 + ) =   1.
The quadratic form
Having recovered the optimal steady state, one can obtain a quadratic loss function; that is, an equation of the form (2.10):
The details of the derivation are set out in the appendix. One can simplify the above expression in a number of ways. Consider the following expression: 9
It is possible to write equation (4.9) in a way that relates it more clearly to the 'standard' loss function often employed which is simply de…ned over output and in ‡ation. First, recall the de…nitions of b
b   can be thought of as the 'labour wedge' of ine¢ciency (note the role price dispersion):
So one can further simplify (4.9) to
¢  (and where details concerning coe¢cients are again given in the Appendix). The 'target' rate is increasing in productivity and declining in the cost-push shock; it is also declining in price dispersion. The variable b   represents, in e¤ect, the losses to the …rm forced to charge suboptimal prices due to price stickiness and expected in ‡ation, to which they may not be able to react.
This form of the loss function can easily be nested to familiar cases, either the non-distorted steady state where © = 1 or where the steady state of the model economy remains distorted but where the social discount rate is equal to the private 9 The coe¢cients of equation (4.9) are positive for reasonable parameterizations.
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rate of discount,  = 1 (in which case the UO policy and the timeless perspective policies coincide). In both special cases optimal monetary policy corresponds to price stability and the loss function (4.10) reduces to a familiar form de…ned simply over in ‡ation and output. Speci…cally, if the optimal steady state is characterized by price stability, then ¤  = 0 Moreover one can easily show that price dispersion, b ¢  , is a second-order term in that case. Lastly, the labour wedge b   is then simply a cost-push shock, b    and can be considered as a term independent of policy.
Application: Unconditional ordering of simple rules
The foregoing approach is easily used to evaluate simple rules for monetary policy and to highlight the potential signi…cance for policy design of a distorted steadystate. First, write the model in vector autoregressive form as follows: 5.11) More compactly, one writes
where   is the vector of endogenous variables and  +1 is the vector of exogenous shocks. In this form it is straightforward to construct the variance-covariance matrix, ´   0  , using standard software such as Dynare. That is,  is recovered by solving the following matrix equation 5.12) where¨=    0  is the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of the underlying shock processes. Equation (5.12) can be solved numerically using a doubling algorithm as described in Anderson, McGrattan, Hansen, and Sargent (1996) using
As demonstrated in section 2.2, the social welfare function is then a linear combination of the elements of matrix  In the above linearized system of equations the …nal equation (5.11) is the
represents a linear combination of policy feedback variables, while   is a policy shock. 10 It is clear that steady-state distortions complicate the policy problem so far as the policymaker's objective function is concerned 11 . However, does it make any di¤erence so far as the design of simple rules are concerned? 12 .
First, a simple interest rate feedback rule is considered, where the interest rate responds to current and lagged in ‡ation only. The feedback on current in ‡ation is …xed at   = 15 Given this, the optimized weight on lagged in ‡ation,  = b  ¡1 , is computed. In both the distorted and non-distorted case the optimal feedback is about 15 in the distorted case and 14 in the non-distorted steady state case. 10 The following parameterization is used in the quantitative investigation:  = 09  = 11  = 7  = 05 and  = 13 It is assumed that shocks,   ,   and   follow (1) processes with:   = 098   = 0008   = 09   = 0005 and   = 09   = 002 11 That is, complicates it relative to the objective function in the non-distorted case. 12 In the particular model developed above, the UO trend in ‡ation is rather small and the policy ordering across distorted and non-distorted steady states is often the same for given simple rules. However, in simulations not reported, it was possible to …nd simple, plausible rules that result in welfare "reversals"; that is, where rule 1 welfare dominates rule 2 in the distorted economy, but where the ranking switched in the non-distorted economy.
However, the di¤erence in welfare between responding and not responding to lagged in ‡ation is quite substantial and may be up to 16 percentage points in terms of consumption equivalent units (see the top right hand graph in the panel below,   is at its optimal value)). As in the TP approach, relative price distortion is very costly and the optimal simple rule may be very close to price stability (  = +1) However, if for any reason the policy reaction on current in ‡ation is restricted, the economy may signi…cantly bene…t from a response to lagged in ‡ation.
One can also show that the optimal feedback on output should be slightly negative,   = ¡0015 Furthermore, inclusion of real output targeting leads to very modest welfare improvements, in the order of 10 ¡3 compared with targeting in ‡ation alone. This result is consistent with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) who found that a positive feedback on real output did not increase welfare.
The results are summed up in Figure 1 (where the broken line is the nondistorted economy). Kim and Henderson (2005) . Kim and Henderson suggest, in a model with one-period price stickiness, that nominal income targeting may have superior welfare properties to in ‡ation targeting. Two rules are compared:
Nominal income growth targeting:
In ‡ation targeting: (5.14) In the case of a non-distorted steady state, and a "low" feedback on in ‡ation the …ndings are similar to some of Kim and Henderson's …ndings. Speci…cally, in the case of a distorted steady-state model, the net welfare gain from targeting 20 nominal income growth over in ‡ation targeting is positive. In the distorted case, in ‡ation targeting is rarely dominated by nominal income targeting. In Figure   2 below, the relative welfare gain (over in ‡ation targeting) in targeting nominal income growth is plotted against    Figure 2 : Relative welfare gain in targeting nominal income growth.
The precise position of these net welfare schedules is quite sensitive to parameterization of the model (in particular, the persistence of shocks) but in general one …nds that as the feedback on in ‡ation rises, in ‡ation targeting is likely to dominate nominal income targeting.
Conclusion
The paper demonstrates that, in general, one is able to obtain a purely quadratic approximate unconditional loss function to a model economy with a distorted steady state. It develops a straightforward, e¢cient approach to implementing the UO algorithm. In an application, it is shown that the loss function may be somewhat more complex than in a model with no steady-state distortions; in ‡ation and output are no longer the sole arguments in the loss function. However, the loss function so obtained is easily interpreted in terms of the underlying distortions in the economy. Furthermore, optimal in ‡ation and nominal interest rates are positive in the steady state. The implications for the ordering of simple rules is brie ‡y explored.
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[18] Kollmann, Robert, 2002, The …rst part of the appendix demonstrates the key result in Section 2.2, namely the existence of the quadratic form, (2.10) . The …rst line of the following block of equations corresponds to the top line of (2.10), the subsequent lines being its quadratic approximation:
Using the constraints    +1 =   , and the property of unconditional expectations that  +1 =   , this can be rewritten as 7.2) Here   and   are pure second-order terms:
Furthermore, using the steady state conditions (2.8) , one can show that the …rst line of expression (7.1) equals zero. Moreover, expression (7.2) consists of  +  = , the steady state value of the loss function and shocks. These are terms independent of policy () Thus, it is proved that the loss function can be represented in a pure quadratic form.
 (  ) =   +   +  + 3
Alternative approaches to recovering UO policy
The approach of some researchers is to solve non-linear problems and then linearize the resulting optimality conditions. For example, in the context of conditionally optimal monetary policy, that is the approach taken by Khan, King and Wolman (2003) . This section demonstrates that this alternative approach also works in the case of unconditionally optimal policy. Speci…cally, the maximization of the unconditional objective (2.10) subject to the linearized analogues of equations (2.2) yields the same solution as log-linearization of the …rst-order conditions (2.6) . The …rst-order conditions to the non-linear problem are written as
The log-linearized versions of these equations are: (7.4) These are simpli…ed by plugging (7.4) into (7.3) and using the steady state conditions (2.8) , 7.5) Turning now to the LQ approach, utility is represented as (2.10) . Hence, the relevant optimization problem is
The new Hamiltonian can be written as
where   and   are the corresponding Lagrange multipliers attached to linearized constraints (7.6) and (7.7) . The resulting …rst-order conditions are
So, it follows that one may write
This is identical to (7.5) with the following relations between Lagrange multipliers One may rewrite (4.8) as (7.8) :
It is easy to see that (1) = 0; (1) = 1 and  (1) = (¡+1)(1¡)
The strict equality obtains in three cases only. First, when prices are ‡exible,  = 0; second, when the future is not discounted by …rms,  = 1; and …nally when there are no distortions in steady state, © = 1
De…ne   =  ¡1() and note that the functions   and  are de…ned on 
. Proof of Proposition 4.2: Uniqueness
The proof is by contradiction. First it is proved that if   1 for any  1    such that  ( 1 ) = 0 it is necessary that  0 ( 1 )  0 By direct di¤erentiation it follows that
and it is easy to show that for any
Since  is continuously di¤erentiable, if a solution of (7.8) is not unique, there will be at least one solution such that  0 ( 1 ) · 0 It has been demonstrated that such a solution is impossible and the necessary contradiction is obtained.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
By the implicit function theorem one concludes that  © = ¡     ©  From section 7.3.2, we know that    0 while  © = () ()  0 Therefore  ©  0 and equilibrium in ‡ation increases with steady state distortions, measured as 1 ¡ ©.
Similarly   = ¡      where   = ()  0 for   1 therefore    0 and optimal in ‡ation declines with the elasticity of labour.
Moreover   = ¡       where   = ¡ (1 ¡ ©())   + © ()    and one may prove by direct di¤erentiation that    0  ln    0 and (1 ¡ ©()) = ( + 1) () ()  0 Therefore    0 and    0 Finally, it is worth noting that steady state in ‡ation can both increase or decrease in price stickiness, since the sign of   may be positive or negative.
A2:
The second-order approximation to unconditional welfare.
In Section 4.2 of the main text we asserted the existence of the following quadratic equation,
where   is the second-order term of the loss function and           ¢    are the second-order terms of the log linear approximation to constraints (4.2)- (4.4) . This section demonstrates how one derives that equation. The model can be rewritten in the following linear-quadratic representation 
